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Europe’s Blues: Theoretical
Soul-Searching after the Rejection
of the European Constitution
T he Spanish, French, Dutch, and Luxem-bourg referenda on the Constitutional Treaty
are the latest, but certainly not the last, flash-
points in a contentious European Union. The
era in which EU politics was determined by
national and European elites ended about 15
years ago. With the Maastricht Accord of 1991,
decision making on European integration en-
tered the contentious world of party competi-
tion, elections, and referenda.
From December 1991 through December
2005 referenda on Europe were held in 19 of
the 25 member states in the EU, and that num-
ber would have climbed to 21 if Portugal and
the UK had not suspended referenda after
defeats in France and the Netherlands. For Por-
tugal, it would have been the first ever referen-
dum on an EU issue; for the UK, the first one
since 1975. Belgium, Germany, Greece, and
Portugal remain the only EU countries that
have not ~yet! held a referendum on a major
EU issue. Of the 27 EU referenda that
have taken place since the Maastricht
Accord ~1991!, six have ended in defeat
for governments.1
Identity
What motivates atti-
tudes on Europe? Terri-
torial identities appear
influential. The reason
for this derives from the
dual nature of gover-
nance. Governance is a
means to achieve col-
lective goods by coordi-
nating human activity.
Efficient governance
should be multi-level because externalities and
scale economies vary across policies. But gov-
ernance is also an expression of community.
Citizens care—passionately—about who exer-
cises authority over them. The functional need
for human cooperation rarely coincides with
the territorial scope of community. This tension
is, we believe, a key to understanding the path
of European integration.
The causal power of identity struck us about
five years ago when we were pouring over new
data on national political parties. We expected
to see a strong association between a party’s
position on the economic left/right dimension
~summarizing economic distribution and the
role of the state in the economy! and its stance
on European integration. But a non-economic
left/right dimension, measured along libertarian
vs. authoritarian lines ~Kitschelt 1994!, proved
to be a more powerful predictor.2 The connec-
tion appears to run through identity ~Hooghe
and Marks 2004!. Commitment to national
symbols and defense of national identity is as-
sociated both with the libertarian0authoritarian
dimension and with attitudes towards European
integration. Political parties oppose European
integration because they believe it weakens
national sovereignty, diffuses self-rule, and un-
dermines national community. In 1984, two
years before the single market, the main source
of opposition to European integration was
social-democratic ~Ray 1999!; by the late
1990s, the largest reservoir of opposition was
among radical nationalist parties.
Several recently published articles find iden-
tity to be a powerful influence on the public’s
attitudes toward European integration ~Diez
Medrano 2003; Herrmann, Brewer, and Risse
2004; McLaren 2002!. Since 1992, when the
European Union’s public opinion instrument,
Eurobarometer, began to ask questions about
identity, the proportion of EU citizens who
describe themselves as exclusively national
~e.g. British, French or Greek only!, rather than
national and European, European and national,
or European only, has varied between 36 and
46 percent, with no discernable trend. Research
shows that such individuals are considerably
more likely to express Euroskeptical opinions
than those with inclusive identities.
Younger, educated, and more informed peo-
ple are more likely to embrace some European
identity than are older, less educated, less in-
formed people. This raises the possibility that
we are seeing a reaction against Europe on the
part of a declining section of the population
~Citrin and Sides 2004: 172-3!.
The European Union internalizes relations
among countries. Conflicts that were formerly
played out in international relations are now
negotiated in the Council of Ministers and the
European Parliament. The politicization of Eu-
ropean integration has increased the political
salience of conceptions of group membership.
A result is that conflict in Europe has been
transformed in the direction of pre-material,
rather than post-material, values.
From Elites to Publics
A theory of regional integration should
tell us about the political conflicts that
constrain jurisdictional architecture: conflicts
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that determine not just the particular deals that are hammered
out from time to time, but the fundamental direction of reform.
Neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism conceived of
European integration as an elite-driven affair. Neofunctionalists,
including Ernst Haas, Joseph Nye, and Philippe Schmitter, ar-
gued that demands for integration arise from interest groups
which form transnational coalitions. Intergovernmentalists, in-
cluding Andrew Moravcsik ~1998!, assumed that interest pres-
sures are bottled in national arenas. But neofunctionalists and
intergovernmentalists agreed that the key players are functional
economic interests, and that they operate as interest groups lob-
bying decision makers.
An elite perspective is plausible so long as EU decision mak-
ing does not appear on the public’s radar screen. However, re-
cent research shows that public opinion on European integration
has become rather well structured ~van der Eijk and Franklin
2004!, is connected to the basic dimensions that frame contesta-
tion in European societies ~Hix 1999; Marks and Steenbergen
2004!, and is expressed not only in EU referenda but also in
national elections ~Evans 2005; Tillman 2004!. As a result, the
incentives facing elites have been transformed. When European
issues are salient for the public, governments, i.e., party leaders
in positions of government authority, anticipate the effect of
their decisions on public opinion—or face the consequences in
elections and referenda.
A Postfunctionalist Theory
While we share with neofunctionalism and intergovernmen-
talism the view that regional integration is triggered by a mis-
match between efficiency and the existing structure of authority,
we do not expect the outcome to reflect interest group pres-
sures. When an issue is politicized, the preferences of the public
and of political parties come into play, and these preferences are
shaped by conceptions of territorial identity.
Group affinities are powerful sources of political conflict
~Massey 2002!, and the very success of the European project
has precipitated a spirited defense of national culture and sover-
eignty. Preferences rooted in identity are often linked to subjec-
tive self-interest, but they cannot be reduced to efficiency or to
the distribution of economic benefits. This suggests that one
should be open-minded—agnostic—about whether the jurisdic-
tions that humans create are, or are not, efficient. Functional
pressures are one thing, regime outcomes are another. Hence,
the term postfunctionalist.
Whither European Integration?
The logic of our argument is that four developments are deci-
sive for the future of the European Union. The first is politiciza-
tion. In time past, observers said that European integration was
driven by a permissive consensus; since the early 1990s, it is
more appropriate to speak of a constraining dissensus. When
European issues are debated in high quorum decision making,
interest groups take a back seat. While most issues are never
raised in such debate, some basic topics—including enlarge-
ment, European social policy, European foreign policy, and the
Constitutional Treaty—engage political parties and the general
public in referenda and national elections.
Several data projects have arrived at the conclusion that the
salience and contentiousness of European integration have in-
creased over the past decade-and-a-half. European issues have
come to feature prominently in the media, in the strategies of
social movements, in public opinion, and in national elections
~Kriesi 2005; Imig and Tarrow 2001, van der Eijk and Franklin
2004!. Figure 1 reveals that the salience of European integration
for political parties has increased since the early 1980s. Fig-
ure 2 displays dissent within parties on Europe since 1984.
Politicization implies that the causality of regional integration
in Europe has changed. The term was first used by neofunction-
alists, and we share their insight that regional integration trans-
forms decision making as integration deepens. But the way it
has done so is surprising.
A second development that influences European integration is
populism. In most European countries, governments have come
to realize that they need the formal acquiescence of their publics
in referenda to go ahead with European reform. Parliamentary
votes are not deemed sufficient. Public referenda are required,
even in countries, such as the UK and the Netherlands, where
the parliament is formally supreme. No scholar or practitioner
predicted this. Because European integration has transformed
democratic politics in its member states, the process of Euro-
pean integration has itself been transformed.
Referenda are not neutral decision making instruments. Refer-
enda side-line political parties because they divorce preferences
over a single decision—e.g. to join the EU, or not; to have a
Constitutional Treaty, or not—from the context of party repre-
sentation in parliament or party control of government. In na-
tional elections, party leaders can squash internal dissent on the
ground that it implies that a party is ineffective and therefore
not worth voting for. Referenda, by contrast, weaken the control
of party leaders, create dissension within parties, and empower
single issue entrepreneurs.
Third, as a result of politicization and populism, territorial
identities have come to play a decisive role in European integra-
tion. Publics are less alert to the economic consequences of in-
tegration than are elites or interest groups, and most citizens
lack the inclination or time to evaluate the cues they receive.
Citizens who do not regard the issue as extremely important are
more easily swayed by appeals to identity than are the attentive
minority. Parties appealing to exclusive national identity have
taken the initiative in public debate.
Figure 1
European Integration in National Election
Manifestos
Note: Proportion of sentences devoted to European integration in
party manifestos for national elections held in EU member states
in a given year. Totals are five-year moving averages for parties
weighted by vote.
Source: Comparative manifesto project (Budge et al. 2001). Thanks
to Andrea Volkens for releasing data for the period 1999–2003.
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Fourth, politicization and populism have energized a long-
standing gap between elites and the public. The public is more
Euro-skeptical than the elite in every EU country, and in most
countries the difference is huge. Figure 3 illustrates this for
1996, the one year when the same questions were asked to elite
and citizen samples. The absolute level of public opinion sup-
port has declined somewhat since the mid-1980s, but this is not
the most important development. The material change is that the
public can no longer be ignored.
Politicization, populism, identity politics, and the elite0public
gap have shaped the causal logic and the outcomes of European
integration. They imply the following:
• A greater incidence of non-compliance in implementation.
When intergovernmental compromise is debated in public
and subject to electoral shaming, party leaders may drag
their feet in implementing EU legislation.
• A greater incidence of deadlock, derogation, and opting-
out in intergovernmental bargaining. The tenure of na-
tional leaders, unlike that of EU leaders, is in the hands of
national constituencies. Competitive electoral bidding in-
duces short-termism and leads candidates to exaggerate
their ability to win concessions in international negotiation.
National grandstanding and unwillingness to compromise
can pay in domestic politics. At the end of the European
summit following the Dutch referendum, the Spanish Dep-
uty Prime Minister Fernandez de la Vega summarized this
state of mind: “It is always better to return without an
agreement than with a bad one that hurts the interests of
Spain” ~International Herald Tribune 2005, June 23: 3!.
• Mutual distrust. One can expect the centrifugal effects de-
scribed above to intensify if political elites begin to distrust
each other. Trust is a vital ingredient in incomplete con-
tracts, and the EU is an extraordinarily incomplete contract.
Distrust creates space for disagreement about whether a
particular behavior is cooperative or exploitative. Such per-
ceptual ambiguities intensify conflict, because they extend
strategic interaction to the interpretation of behavior. Dis-
trust shrinks iterated interaction into discrete, single-shot,
components by increasing discount rates and shortening
time horizons.
One possible response to these pressures is to insulate Euro-
pean institutions from party competition by delegating to func-
tionally specific jurisdictions. Elsewhere, we describe these as
type 2 jurisdictions which are created to solve particular policy
problems, such as setting a technical standard or managing a
public good or bad ~Hooghe and Marks 2003!. There are many
examples in the EU, including independent European agencies
for aviation, drug addiction, the environment, food safety, mari-
time safety, medical product evaluation, training, work safety
and health, and vocational training. Type 2 jurisdictions loosen
the link between identity and governance. They are flexible with
respect to territorial coverage, and they generally deal with
problems amenable to Pareto optimal solutions. Instead of
encompassing territorial communities, type 2 jurisdictions
coordinate individuals who share some geographical or func-
tional space, for example, as machinery exporters, part-time
workers, medicine consumers, or shippers. Membership in such
functional communities is extrinsic: It encompasses one aspect
of one’s identity, and an individual, no matter where he or she
is living, can belong to several. What is more, there is no obvi-
ous limit to the number of functionally specific jurisdictions.
There is a second way in which ruling elites could lower
the heat: by avoiding behavior that ignites EU referenda. They
could do so by a! making fewer treaties or b! negotiating
treaties that escape referendum treatment. If, as we argue, it
Figure 2
Dissent inside National Parties on
European Integration
Note: Data are averages across EU political parties weighted by
vote, rescaled 0 to 1. Experts were asked “How much internal
dissent has there been in party X over European integration over
the course of 2002? If you believe that a party is completely united
on European integration, please circle 1. If you believe it is
extremely divided, circle 10.”
Source: Ray 1999; Marks and Steenbergen 2004; Steenbergen and
Marks forthcoming; see www.unc. edu/~gwmarks for cumulative data
set and questionnaires.
Figure 3
The Elite-Public Gap on European
Integration
Note: National elite data are from a one-time survey conducted
among 3700 respondents of the political, administrative, socio-
economic, media and cultural elites in the then-fifteen member
states (see Spence 1997). Public opinion data are averages across
the two Eurobarometers held in 1996. Both surveys are weighted
for country population. The questions posed to elites and public are
the same. Net membership refers to those finding membership a
good thing minus those finding it a bad thing; net benefit to those
finding their country has benefited from membership minus those
finding it has not.
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makes sense to endogenize referenda in a theory of regional
integration, why should one not also endogenize treaties?
Treaties, like referenda, are instruments of purpose. If the refer-
endum could be eliminated, not a few political leaders would
breathe a sigh of relief. Could one not stem referenda by cutting
off their source—the grand treaties?
Another possibility would be to call the bluff of the Euro-
skeptics by raising the stakes in an up-or-down vote on mem-
bership. The proportion of citizens who would like to scrap the
European Union has never exceeded 15 percent since Euroba-
rometer polling began in 1973. Would such a referendum not
split defenders of the national?
Notes
1. Denmark ~1992: Maastricht Treaty!, Denmark ~2000: EMU!, Ireland
~2001: Nice Treaty!, Sweden ~2003: EMU!, France ~2005: Constitutional
Treaty!, and the Netherlands ~2005: Constitutional Treaty!. This does not
include no-votes in Switzerland ~1992!, on accession to the European Eco-
nomic Area, and in Norway ~1994!, on accession to the European Union.
2. This non-economic dimension summarizes several non-economic
issues—ecological, life-style, and communal. In some countries, environ-
mental protection and sustainable growth are core issues; in others, it is
traditional values rooted in a secular0religious divide; in yet others, immi-
gration and nationalism predominate. We therefore describe the poles of this
dimension with composite terms: Green0Alternative0Libertarian ~or Gal !
and Traditionalism0Authority0Nationalism ~or Tan!.
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